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Introduction

This report — *Social Media and Conflict in South Sudan II: A Lexicon of Hate Speech Terms 2017-2018* — follows on its predecessor which was released in December 2016 after three years of civil war in South Sudan.¹ It identifies key terms being used in the conflict, as well as new terms, context, and dynamics in South Sudan’s conflict over the period of 2017-2018.

Since the outbreak of violence in 2013 in the world’s newest country, South Sudanese have called attention to how hate speech has inflamed violent conflict.² Indeed, online hate speech was a concern even before the onset of hostilities in December 2013.^{3,4} Diaspora communities around the world have increasingly expressed their grievances through social media, often using inflammatory language and images. Most online hate speech has originated among the Diaspora; it has been both an instigator and an echo chamber of the conflict back home.

PeaceTech Lab’s work in South Sudan has been multifaceted, ranging from producing Sawa Shabab peace radio programming and designing remote social media monitoring for online hate speech to developing predictive analytics and publishing early warning reports for violence prevention initiatives. This project seeks to tackle the problem of identifying and contextualizing the particular type of language that’s likely to cause violence. Rather than assessing the existence or prevalence of hate speech language, this project instead examines the terms and their use in a particular country context. To successfully monitor and counter hate speech, we must first identify specific terms and the social and political context that makes them offensive, inflammatory, or even potentially dangerous.⁵

This lexicon was produced by PeaceTech Lab as part of a US Institute of Peace-funded initiative that aims to promote inclusive and durable peace processes in South Sudan. The goal of this project is to better understand the origins and context of online hate speech currently being used in order to 1) raise awareness about the dangers of such speech; 2) better understand and manage the drivers of conflict; and 3) support efforts to conduct effective mitigation of online hate speech and thus limit its impact in the conflict.

PeaceTech Lab has produced this new lexicon of terms used online during a particular period of South Sudan’s civil war in order to understand the role these terms play in the conflict. This research also seeks to identify alternative language that would mitigate or counter the impact of this speech on the conflict and thereby help build peace in the country. Finally, this resource intends to inform other individuals and organizations involved in monitoring and countering hate speech in South Sudan—and potentially elsewhere—so that their work can be more effective.

To compose the lexicon, project staff undertook human and automated monitoring of online news and information to generate the terms that are contributing to the conflict. The Annex at the end includes a description of the research structure, methodology, and operation.

The Lexicon

A Summary of the Conflict in South Sudan

Sudan and South Sudan have known war for nearly their entire post-independence history. The First Sudanese Civil War, which had begun before independence in 1956, ended when Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri agreed to a measure of autonomy for the country's south in 1972. When Nimeiri ended that autonomy in 1983, the south took up arms. This Second Sudanese Civil War ended after 22 years of war, which included four years of formal negotiations that resulted in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In the course of this war, two million people died and more than four million were displaced, with more civilians killed than in any conflict since World War II.⁶ The CPA included a provision for a referendum that allowed the south to vote to secede from Sudan. In January 2011, South Sudanese voted overwhelmingly to do so, and in July 2011, South Sudan became the world's newest state. Yet self-determination brought a host of issues that the CPA didn't address. When subsequent negotiations between Sudan and the new state eroded in 2012 over oil field and oil production, South Sudan shut down its oil production, which sent the new state's oil-dependent economy into a tailspin. This incident exacerbated long-term issues of underdevelopment, a war-shattered economy and society, a low-level economic and political conflict with Sudan, and competition for resources among South Sudanese and within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

Origins of New Conflict

Additionally, existing political divisions within the SPLM, formed during the long conflict with Khartoum, continued to grow. Upon independence, these splits resurfaced at the national level as well as more locally, especially as governance came to be seen as a way to reward allies and loyalists. The divisions came to a head in 2013 over who would lead the SPLM in South Sudan's first post-independence elections. Riek Machar—a Nuer leader from Leer who led a bloody split from the SPLM in the 1990s but who became Vice President under the CPA—and SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum publicly challenged how President Salva Kiir, a Dinka from Bahr-el-Ghazal, was leading the SPLM and the government. In July 2013, President Kiir dismissed nearly his entire cabinet, including Vice President Machar, removed governors of three states, and suspended SPLM chair Pagan Amum.⁷ Relations had worsened by December, and Kiir declared that Machar and other prominent leaders were guilty of treason for organizing a coup.⁸ In Juba, Dinka forces of the Presidential Guard killed Nuer in the SPLA and Nuer civilians.⁹ Machar and leaders from the Nuer and other tribes formed the SPLM-IO (In Opposition) to take up arms against what they saw as a Dinka-dominated government. The conflict spread from Juba to Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states and has featured horrific atrocities and killings of civilians based on their tribe or community: in Juba, Nuer were killed by SPLA Dinka forces of the Presidential Guard, while Dinkas were killed in Bor by the Nuer White Army; in Bentiu, Nuer were killed by Dinka soldiers; and, in Upper Nile, Dinkas were killed by Nuer soldiers from the IO.¹⁰ The conflict didn't exist in a vacuum, as South Sudan's neighbors intervened in different ways. For example, Sudan did so indirectly by providing arms while Uganda chose to do so more directly by intervening on behalf of the government as it did in 2014 with hundreds of its forces, tanks, and helicopters in Bor.¹¹ Under the threat of international sanctions, the two sides begrudgingly signed a peace agreement in August 2015 and a transitional government of national unity, including both Kiir and Machar, was established in April 2016.¹²

However, this peace didn't last. In early July 2016, there were skirmishes resulting in the deaths of several SPLA and SPLA-IO troops. On July 8, while President Kiir, First Vice President Riek Machar, and Second Vice President James Wani Igga were meeting at the presidential palace, fighting broke out between presidential guard troops and SPLA-IO forces which then spread out into the city. The next day the city was relatively calm, but on July 10 the conflict erupted in full force. Army elements then attacked Machar's Juba stronghold, sparking a bloody round of violence that led to the deaths of an estimated 300 people and the displacement of tens of thousands. The United Nations panel of experts on South Sudan found that "the fighting was directed by the highest levels of the SPLA command structure."¹³ With Machar and some IO members fleeing the country, SPLM-IO members remaining in Juba mobilized to form a new grouping and chose Taban Deng as chairman. Kiir then installed him as First Vice President of the Transitional Government of National Unity in place of Machar—actions Machar and others considered in violation of the peace agreement and the SPLM-IO charter.¹⁴ Machar and allies threatened to return to war¹⁵ and the government responded that there was "no place" for them in South Sudan's politics unless they renounced violence.¹⁶

Involvement of Regional and International Actors

In August, the Juba government rejected a UN Security Council-approved initiative by South Sudan's neighbors, the African Union, and the international community to deploy an additional 4,000 international troops — a 'Regional Protection Force' — with a robust mandate.¹⁷ Subsequently, Machar indicated that his return would be predicated on the deployment of the new force, while the government signaled that it would accept international forces on different terms.¹⁸ Such statements notwithstanding, there was no progress on actual deployment of the force during 2016. Meanwhile, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warned of the existence of hate speech and incitement to violence,¹⁹ the UN Special Adviser on Genocide Prevention reported that the country was "ripe for the commission of mass atrocities" and genocide,²⁰ and a special UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan found "a steady process of ethnic cleansing underway."²¹

Fighting continued into 2017. The UN Security Council met concerning South Sudan, and its members addressed the issue of hate speech in press statements.²² By February, the fighting had led to a famine being declared in parts of the country. The UN made clear the famine was a man-made catastrophe caused by the civil war and economic collapse.²³ However, the declaration had little effect on the behavior of combatants; UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O'Brien reported in March that the "situation is worse than it has ever been," and "active hostilities, access denials and bureaucratic impediments continue to curtail...efforts to reach people who...need help." At the same time, "aid workers have been killed" — many of whom were South Sudanese and perceived by both sides as aiding the other side — and "humanitarian compounds and supplies have been attacked, looted and occupied by armed actors."²⁴ In late May, President Kiir declared a unilateral ceasefire and launched a long-delayed national dialogue process²⁵, which was criticized as non-inclusive and lacking substance²⁶. Nonetheless, the UN Security Council voted days later to renew sanctions on South Sudan, as well as extend the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring the conflict.²⁷ By mid-June, South Sudan's neighbors, having failed to bring the parties to the negotiating table, began a major diplomatic initiative. Meeting in Addis, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) decided to convene a High-level Revitalization Forum (HLRF) of parties to the ARCSS of 2015, including currently "estranged" parties to bring in newer, previously-excluded

factions. To revitalize the 2015 agreement, the heads of state stated that the HLRF's goals were to obtain a ceasefire, implement the ARCSS, and develop new realistic guidelines for a period of transitional governance leading to national elections.²⁸ Meanwhile, the first elements of the Regional Protection Force only began to arrive in August 2017.²⁹

The conflict's impact on the region was profound; that summer, the UN announced that the number of refugees who had fled violence in South Sudan for neighboring Uganda stood at more than one million.³⁰ With pockets of fighting still continuing, the country devastated and exhausted, and a renewed regional diplomatic push coupled with the threat of additional sanctions, the conflict's antagonists signed a cessation of hostilities agreement in December 2017. Over the course of 2017, the conflict had spread throughout the country as had famine: two-thirds of South Sudan's counties had suffered famine or acute levels of food insecurity³¹, the economy had essentially collapsed, and government workers were not being paid. In addition to calling a halt to the fighting, the accord addressed the protection of civilians and humanitarian access to the displaced.³² While the agreement was violated shortly thereafter, over the first few months of 2018, fighting began to decrease.³³

Famine, Sanctions, and Peace Agreements

In late June, under pressure from the region, Kiir and Machar signed a ceasefire in Khartoum after nearly walking away a few days prior.³⁴ Nonetheless, frustrated with the lack of progress, the UN Security Council voted for an arms embargo and placed sanctions on two military leaders in July.³⁵ Two months later, Kiir signed a power-sharing agreement with Machar and other opposition groups, essentially superseding the ARCSS of 2015. Among the agreement's provisions, Machar would return to government as First Vice President alongside four other vice-presidents.³⁶ While the warring parties had finally come to the table, the cost had been immense: an analysis of the conflict released in the fall of 2018 estimated that 380,000 people died in nearly five years of conflict with half of them killed directly in the fighting. Additionally, 2.5 million South Sudanese had become refugees in other countries while almost 2 million others had been displaced from their homes inside the country.³⁷ The combined 4.5 million people displaced inside and outside the country is approximately half of the population of the country and equals the amount displaced in the entire 30 years of the Second Sudanese Civil War.³⁸ It had been deadly in other ways as well, as 107 aid workers and 13 journalists had been killed during the conflict.³⁹ According to humanitarian agencies, "severe food insecurity" was affecting the population as a whole, with 60% in crisis or catastrophic conditions as of September 2018.⁴⁰

Since the September 12, 2018 signing of the 'revitalized' ARCSS (R-ARCSS) peace agreement, there have been outbreaks of fighting between SPLM-IO and the government in Unity and Upper Nile states, between Cirilo/NAS and the IO in Yei River State, and involving other opposition groups that did not sign the agreement. As 2018 came to a close, lasting peace and stability remained elusive for South Sudan's people.⁴¹

Words or Phrases That Are Offensive and Inflammatory

The words and phrases that follow were the terms identified as ‘offensive and inflammatory’ in the context of the civil war in South Sudan by human monitors involved in the project. Each term’s ranking, meaning, and context were further evaluated by South Sudanese workshop participants gathered in Kenya, as well as by the project’s South Sudanese expert advisors (see Methodology below). Their ranking or order of appearance is based on their ‘potency’ in terms of incitement to violence and their ‘prevalence’ on social media. Based on these terms and their associated data, project staff then employed automated monitoring to identify examples of such terms in online posts, as well as ‘word clouds’ that show how the terms are associated with other terms, actions, or events.

PLEASE NOTE: The sample posts and quoted comments from online posts may contain offensive and inflammatory terms as well as obscene terms.

1) MTN

Other spellings and related references: *MTN cowards; unwanted luggage; unwanted baggage; unwanted goods*

Sample post:

South South,
You are truly an ungrateful animal to say the least, better watch your mouth ya MTN kelip. This time we'll make sure that you human wastes are methodically hunted and dealt with. We'll give you hell until you quit Equatoria. This is the only language you jienges understand!

REPONDRE MESSAGE

Midit
So your true tribalist colours have surfaced at last, anyway, it doesn't bother us. Equatorians will stand behind Gen. Thomas. We are now mobilising all Equatorians, those trapped in both bogus SPLM's, in diaspora and across G. Equatoria to join the true resistance. Soon all MTN's will regret their arrogance and crimes perpetrated against our peaceful people. Anyanya 1

REPONDRE MESSAGE

Definition: The term is derived from the slogan for the MTN mobile service provider that MTN coverage is ‘Everywhere you go.’ It has come to refer to Dinkas since that community is present in more states than any other community and reflects a fear of their increasing influence in the other communities’ traditional areas, including occupation or use of others’ traditional lands. However, in 2016, it became a prominent term in the conflict within the Equatoria region, where people from Equatoria and rebel sympathizers allied with Riek Machar coordinated the killing of Dinka civilians traveling on the popular Juba-Nimule and Yei roads. This was exacerbated by the circulation of a video by a South Sudanese in the USA who alleged that Gen. Paul Malong and the SPLA were coming to kill Equatorians; the video was later denounced by Malong. Related phrases — *unwanted baggage, unwanted luggage, or unwanted goods* — have also been used by rebels to refer to Dinka traveling on buses along the Nimule road and to identify them for attacks. Some argued that Equatorians’ use of this term was in retaliation against the predominantly Dinka government soldiers for using civilian vehicles as cover in the conflict. In

addition, some Dinkas have used the term to refer to other Dinka that they believe have ruined the country.

Why it is offensive/inflammatory: This is a highly inflammatory term and has led directly to violence. In general, it creates a sense that the Dinkas are increasing their presence and influence throughout the country especially over coveted lands; indeed, rebels have recruited youth by drawing on this sentiment. More specifically and importantly, it is used to refer to and identify Dinkas for their targeting and killing. *MTN without service* can mean that a Dinka is unarmed and therefore may be easily attacked; *without service* has also been used to describe Dinkas as lacking critical thinking abilities. As such, the term incites and escalates violent action, which then brings on retaliation and new cycles of conflict. Finally, it also increases polarization, as one commenter noted,

“Such denigration and overgeneralization pushes even the moderate Dinka and those bitterly opposed to the government to seek refuge in the government for the sake of uncertainty.”

Alternative words that could be used: Dinka; South Sudanese; Junubeen; Monyang; Jieng

2) Kokora

Other spellings and related references: *Korkor; korkora; Equatexit*

Sample post:

Rhino

Thank you for these encouraging words. It was the Equatorians that revived this movement after a near total collapse. Equatorians again voted overwhelmingly for referendum in Jan 2011. Again jienges greedily wanted everything for themselves. Now this kiirminal comes to Lo'bonok and spews shit. So what? NAS is here to stay. Federalism/kokora or death. Jienge-free Equatoria 🙏

REPONDRE MESSAGE

Eastern/The Rhino

Remember KOKORA their was no Guns involved only the people of Equatoria decided to those idiot jengelon back to their dirty luaks exactly this's what's going to happen no need to use guns to avoid more victims just focus there are so many ways to send those jengelon & tier Government back luak so they go after it period

REPONDRE MESSAGE

Definition: While a literal meaning of *Kokora* is ‘federalism,’ this term means ‘division’ or ‘separation’ in Bari, with the interpretation that everyone should go to their ancestral homeland to work or settle. It originated in the 1972 Addis Ababa agreement at the end of the First Sudanese Civil War, which called for re-organization of three southern provinces—Bahr-el-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile—into one southern region. Equatorians generally favored autonomy, while the other provinces preferred unification. In 1983, Nimeiri responded with a decree that



In the current context, it is also used to suggest Equatorians are fighting for a confederal state and thus undermining South Sudanese national unity. This has some basis in fact; for example, the NAS group under Thomas Cirilo and others did not sign the R-ARCSS because it lacked provisions for federalism. Finally, the term has been turned on Equatorians to suppress their complaints against land-grabbing and encroachment by Dinka pastoralists.

Alternative words that could be used: federal; federalism; local autonomy

3) Nuer wew/nuer wew

Other spellings and related references: *Nuerwew, Nuerweu, camjiec Nuer wew, Nuer wew food lovers, nueri yioni*

Sample posts:




Definition: A phrase used by both Nuer in SPLM-In Opposition and some Equatorians to disparage those Nuer who either sided with the Kiir government or who support Taban Deng Gai. One workshop participant said it first emerged in January 2014 when someone challenged Nuer politician Rachael Nyadak for her call not to fight the government, while another cited Gen. Gatdet who criticized Nuer for standing by while their brethren were being killed: “Is it wew that keeps you in silence.” According to one commenter, the phrase emerged to describe Nuer whose loyalty is believed to have been purchased given that they came to join the Juba government even after the massacre of Nuer by government forces there in December 2013. The phrase portrays Nuer as money-minded or money lovers whose reasoning is overtaken by greed and who sided with the government for self-interest, not community interest. Referencing the role played by those Nuer allies for the Kiir government, a Facebook commenter taunted others that “If there was no so called nuer wew you cannot dance.” Indeed, any association with the government is seen as the result of bribery.

4) Nyagat

Other spellings and related references: *anyagat, nyigaat, nyagaat, nyegat, nyigad, nyigat, rebel; renegade; militia; Mutameridin; marry a Nuer and you'll have rebel children; Negade (Amharic)*

Sample Post



Thinking aloud The mindset of nyagat dont rest, for they belief in cheap campaign to sustain them and lets followers believe that there is still a problem to continue to fight. These nyagats dont know how much his people are suffering.

Like · Reply · 19w

Ya One People, ibn al wiska kawal. If IO truly went on a raping spree like the worthless jienge creatures, then they deserve death and we shall make sure they don't escape through Equatoria. Raping is NEVER a culture among Equatorians except among jienges and nyagats. Children from raped women often end up as numskulls, idiots with low IQ.

REPONDRE MESSAGE

Definition: The word appears to have its origins as *Nagadi/Nigadi*, which was Amharic for 'trader.' The term is believed to have been coined by Ethiopia's Mengistu in 1975 to refer negatively to mutineers from the Sudanese Army who had settled down in Ethiopia rather than foster active rebellion in southern Sudan. The term is used broadly across South Sudan's communities, with minor variations in spelling and pronunciation, and is even used by politicians on television to criticize the opposition. The most common definitions that respondents provided were traitor, defector, sellout, and rebel. An early use of the term emerged from the split between SPLA/M and Anyanya II forces in Ethiopia in the 1980s, where the SPLA/M referred to the Anyanya II as Nyagat. Most survey participants identified it as a derogatory Dinka word for rebels, and in the context of the conflict started in 2013, a word for Riek Machar and his allies, but it has sometimes been applied to Nuer people generally. Even more so, anyone from Kiir's side who joined Machar's SPLM-IO was considered a sellout. Conversely, anyone from Machar's community who supported Kiir was a sellout. A separate phrase, *Nuer weu*, emerged to describe Nuer who supported Kiir's government.

5) Nyam nyam

Other spellings and related references: *yam yam*


Sample Posts

20 0000 2017 11 06, 07 South Sudan

jubaone,

I am just talking about a coward Nyam-Nyam who makes a lot of empty noises in through internet.

REPONDRE MESSAGE

 **Nyam-nyam are nothing.**

Like · 1y

Definition: This term is believed to have originated in the Bahr el-Ghazal tributaries. Dinka people there referred to a tribe (the Azande) as *Niam-Niam* as they were feared by their neighbors for the ferocity with which they fought as well as for reports of incidents of their cannibalism. It has retained its association to eating. More recently, both Dinkas and Nuer are reported to use this term to refer to Equatorians. A broad range of definitions were identified in this context: weak, in reference to Equatorian fighting skills; stupid; and donkey. In addition, the term is used to describe someone from Equatoria as very short, as eating everything or eating all the time, and, if given something worthwhile, would sell out for some food. There was a belief among pastoralists that Azande people in Western Equatoria practiced cannibalism and as such the pastoralists labeled them *nyam nyam*. It isn't clear whether the term is always viewed as offensive since many South Sudanese apparently believe that other tribes, and even their own, practice cannibalism. As a result, the term is used broadly. At least one respondent indicated that Dinkas use the term to describe non-Dinkas.



Why it's offensive/inflammatory: In general, using this term aims to demean Equatorians and establish the speaker's superiority by assigning Equatorians negative traits, appearances, or habits. It conveys both terror as well as contempt and as such is quite provocative.

Alternative words that could be used: people of Equatoria; people of (Yambio, Maridi, Yei, Juba, etc.)

6) Stooze

Other spellings and related references: *Yes-man; puppets; sycophants; opportunists; boot lickers; kitchen boys.*

Sample posts:

17 SEPTEMBER 2018, 09:00 AM

and some of their lowly Equatorians as their pawns or foot soldiers to 'drive home' their 'regime change business' of Mr. Salva Kiir and his allies government. And be replaced with their puppets/stoozes, thieves & traitors like Mr. Riek Machar, Lam Akol, Pagan Amuom, Thomas Cirillo, Rebecca Nyandeng, her son, Majak Agoot, Adwok Nyabe and others fellows. And then those foreign puppets/stoozes>>>

REPONDRE MESSAGE



James George Joseph Aleu haven't you noticed they are all his people, or those like Taban Deng Gai are toothless stooges, with no backbone period.

[Like](#) · [Reply](#) · 14w

Definition: It is used to refer to a person who is seen as a puppet or pawn of someone else, a person who doesn't reason on their own, or a person who has little or no political influence or voice. For example, a commenter on the online Sudan Tribune declared,

29 OCTOBER 2017 04:01, by **James George**

Lomuro, Equatoria stooge, there must be election in 2018: You and your uncle Kiirdit must give southerners a chance to choose their leader, idiot Dr Risky be brought to take part in election fullstop.

REPONDRE MESSAGE

Another commenter on the same platform argued that,

29 OCTOBER 2017 04:01, by **James George**

These are Jienge criminals trying to boost their stooge Taban.

REPONDRE MESSAGE

A workshop participant observed that Equatorians also use *stooge* against other Equatorians, while another suggested it is not generally associated with a particular tribe. It is also often used within groups to stigmatize or provoke others to fall in line with others/join in the cause.



Why it is offensive/inflammatory: The term is offensive because it is used to characterize someone as following a leader rather mindlessly or out of self-interest at the expense of the country. It is offensive because no one wants to be seen as a pawn of someone else or under another person's control. The term creates division and mistrust between communities and their leaders. It is used to delegitimize the authority of leaders, especially if they are working with the Kiir leadership.

Alternative words that could be used: loyalist; follower; supporter; public servant

7) Cow

Other spellings and related references: *Sup Re bagar* or *Aklak zeta bargar*; *baggara*; *cattle keepers*

Sample posts



Definition: Equating people or their behavior to a cow was reported to be common in many languages, including English, Arabic, Dinka, Chollo (Shilluk), and Nuer. It was usually intended for Dinkas but was also used to describe the Nuer and other cattle-keeping people. This was most likely due to the chronic conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists over land.


Why it's offensive/inflammatory: It is a term that dehumanizes the person being targeted. According to several respondents, the speaker uses the term to establish his or her superiority and the inferiority of the other. In particular, it's meant to describe someone as unruly, unethical, and unfriendly and as one who abuses favors and hospitality, disrespects the feelings of others, and doesn't respect the privacy or customs that govern the cultures of non-pastoralists or host communities. It's used mostly to refer to Dinkas, who are cattle-keepers historically. As the respondents noted, cows are good only for slaughter and so it's offensive to compare animals with humans, who have the capacity for reason.


Alternative words that could be used: Brothers or sisters from Bor, Malakal, Bentiu, or Lakes state, etc.; cattle keepers

8) Insect/insects

Other spellings and related references: *nyor*; *nyornyor*; *nyor insects*; *JCE insects* (see below); *Dinka insects*; *jienge insects*; *mosquitoes*

Sample posts:





Definition: Insect is used against an enemy to define the person or group as sub-human, miniscule, and vulnerable. For South Sudan, it has been used by different groups for different contexts and almost exclusively on social media. According to a workshop participant, Sudan’s president Omar Bashir first used it in 2012 to demean those resisting his forces in Heglig, and it re-appeared in 2016 when Kiiir’s supporters used it while trying to crush rebels under Thomas Cirilo as well as Equatoria IO forces in the region of the Equatorias. Specifically, it is mostly used by the SPLA Dinka forces against Cirilo’s and Machar’s fighters to intimidate them by communicating that they are powerless and will be wiped out like insects or mosquitoes. In response, the term has provoked non-Dinka and Equatorian opposition or rebels to fight back to show they are not insects. In the current conflict, it is also used in a demeaning way against Dinka with the association that, as pastoralists, they are ‘wanderers’ just moving about without a home like bees buzzing about. One workshop speaker noted that Equatorians use the term against Dinka - especially in Nimule, Tori, Yei, and Kapoeta - because they don’t want the Dinka on their traditional lands. The associated term *nyor* is an Arabic term used during the liberation struggle to refer to southern Sudanese rebels.


Why it is offensive/inflammatory: Since insects are not human and are considered pests or carriers of disease, they can be exterminated as they are not useful and even dangerous. Thus, used against human beings, this term is dehumanizing and suggests that the targeted person or group is not human but rather is irrational and worthless, and that their killing can be morally justified. Given that insects exist in large numbers, use of the term against human beings carries strong connotations of indiscriminate murder or slaughter not only of military forces but of civilians as well.

Alternative words that could be used: pastoralists; farmers; natives

9) Jenge

Other spellings and related references: *Jienge; jienges; jengetat; Jengetot; Jaang; Jenge crooks; the Jiangs; Jienge awir; Jiang; Jienge savages; Aryan jienge; Jienge waskan; Aryan jienge sakit; Jienge Miscreants/scoundrels; Jiengestans; Jenkocrats*

Sample post:




Why it is offensive/inflammatory: When used in a critical way, the term dehumanizes Dinkas by associating them with cattle, characterizing the targeted person or group as illiterate, primitive, and irrational, and implying that they can be harmed without moral concern. This has origins, and thus resonance, in Arabs' historic treatment of Dinka. More specifically, it scapegoats the Dinka people generally for the behavior of individual Dinkas in the government and army to include self-appointed leaders such as the Jieng Council of Elders (JCE). Consequently, individual Dinka may be targeted for attacks to avenge acts perpetrated by the government or Dinka militias.

Alternative words that could be used: Dinka; South Sudanese from (name of state); Junubeen; Jieng; Monjang; Nas Bahr-el-Ghazal, Nas Rumbek, Nas Awiel, Nas Wau, Nas Raja, Nas Bor.

10) Food lovers

Other spellings and related references: *Stomach fighters, food fighter, stomach feeders, Nuerwew food fighters, camjiec, nyamnyam, hyena*

Sample post:



Definition: Dinkas use *food lover* to characterize Equatorians particularly in the context of the fighting in Equatoria, but they also use it against Nuer. The Nuer in turn sometimes use the phrase to refer to those Nuer who sided with the Kiir government such as Taban Deng Gai. In Equatoria, it is used to refer to Wani Igga and to those who remain with the Kiir government. Since eating food involves relaxation or enjoyment, using the phrase suggests the person or group is preoccupied with self-fulfillment, is weak, and is not a fighter. As one commenter put it, "Fighting is not eating of yams." More specifically, it's been used to characterize Members of Parliament (MPs) who, once elected, move to live in hotels in Juba while their constituents are dying in protection of civilians' (POC) camps. A workshop attendee saw it, however, as meaning 'political prostitute' more broadly, referring to people who make decisions about joining a side often to take care of their family. It can also be used to characterize someone who changes allegiance once resources have 'dried up' with the current group or political party.

Why it is offensive/inflammatory: Using the term to allege someone is only fighting in order to be fed demonizes that person as aimless, a sell-out, a traitor, and without principles. Such a person is a threat and measures taken against them, including violence, would be morally justified. The Nuer who have sided with the Kiir government, whose forces are responsible for massacres of Nuer civilians, are seen as betraying the Nuer community and only looking out for their stomachs. One Facebook commenter argued,



Or as another commenter warned,




The word could also provoke a different reaction since those are called *Nuer wew* or ‘food lover’ might be incited to join the fight to avoid being seen as cowards.

Alternative words that could be used: Kiir supporters; government supporters

11) Foolish majority

Other spellings and related references: *None*

Sample post:



Definition: This English language phrase has roots in the politics of the 1970s and 1980s among the Dinka elite. It is frequently used in spoken conversation rather than written. Most often it is used by one Dinka group against another Dinka group, for example, Dinka Bor against Dinka from Bahr-el-Ghazal (where President Kiir originates). Dinka Bor claim to be better educated than those from Bahr-el-Ghazal, and this has led to conflict between them. In addition, since the death of John Garang, Dinka Bor have felt sidelined by the Kiir government which is dominated by Garang’s compatriots from Bahr-el-Ghazal. Since Dinka are the predominant group represented in the current government, it may also be used to refer negatively to the current government’s leadership. For example, there are instances of Equatorians and other tribes, who believe the government is unrepresentative, referring to Dinka generally as the *foolish majority*. Finally, Equatorians and other tribes have used the phrase to refer to Dinka and Nuer together as a way of blaming the two communities for the actions of their most prominent actors — Kiir and Machar — in the country’s downfall.


Why it is offensive/inflammatory: It attributes a negative individual characteristic — foolish or unreasonable — to a group of people and blames them for the country’s situation. For example, it is one thing to criticize a decision of the government whose leaders are primarily Dinka from Bahr-el-Ghazal, but it is inciting to label a group of people as foolish. No one entire group is foolish while another entire group is clever. It also creates distrust among the various Dinka communities. Finally, it also implies the Dinka should not be leading the country as no one would want to be led by fools.

Alternative words that could be used: Kiir government; Bahr-el-Ghazal Dinka; illiterate; uneducated; unsophisticated

12) Jallab/Jellab

Other spellings and related references: *jallaba/jellaba; djellaba; Taban el-jallab; Jellaba bastard; jellaba masters; mundukuru; jana mundukuru; jana haram; Khartoumer; Bangbang*


Sample post:



Definition: *Jallab/Jellab* is a relatively neutral term used by South Sudanese to mean Arab or northerner. However, it has powerful historical resonance as it refers to those northerners who came to the south to facilitate the capture and trade of southerners as slaves, which some southerners assisted. In a more current usage, it is used to refer to Arabs and South Sudanese who collaborated and fought with the Arab north during the north-south Sudan conflict. It can also refer to those southerners who stayed in the north or in government-controlled areas during the liberation struggle and thus were not seen to have sacrificed or suffered for independence. It was commonly used during the CPA and after independence to refer to returnees from the north and to identify supporters from SPLM liberated areas and those from Khartoum-controlled areas. It is highly inflammatory since it refers to this relationship with the north or to a person’s Arab heritage. People who spoke Arabic as their language were often referred to as *nas Jalaba* — collaborators with the enemy — who don’t deserve the same opportunities as those who suffered.

Why it is offensive/inflammatory: Using this term alone or in combination with other terms can be highly inflammatory given the history of South Sudan’s relationship with Sudan and northerners - a history that spans the north’s slave raids into the south to present day conflicts over oil and the border. Indeed, in military training, southerners were told that the common enemy was *Jalaba*. For example, *Taban elllab/Taban Jallaba* (Taban the Arab) refers to the belief that Taban Deng Gai had an Arab father; similarly, *jellaba bastard* would refer to someone of mixed heritage but with the added insult of being intimate with the enemy. *Jellaba bastard* also has racial connotations in that it can be used to insult or discriminate against someone whose skin has lighter complexion. Since Abyei is on the border with Sudan, some Dinkas have referred

to Abyei Dinka as being *fake Dinka* or as Dinka having *jallaba blood*. *Jellaba masters* implies that someone is under the control or pay of Bashir and Sudanese authorities. As an example, an online Sudan Tribune commenter wrote,





In general, when used critically, it is synonymous with traitor as it refers to those who helped the north in the liberation struggle.

Alternative words that could be used: Arab; Sudanese; South Sudanese who collaborate with the government of Sudan

13) JCE/Jieng Council of Elders

Other spellings and related references: *Jaang council of evils; JCE insects; JCE Boot Lickers; JCE Kingdom; JCE regime; JCE government*


Sample posts:




Definition: These terms all refer to the Jieng Council of Elders, which is a group of powerful Dinka chiefs and retired politicians, academics, and soldiers founded after the 2013 crisis. Many critics of the Kiir government see them as ‘the power behind the throne,’ and perhaps even personally benefiting from the war. They are believed to be influential in government and society as their members include people of prominence like Ambrose Riiny, the former Chief Justice. However, some Dinka elites, Dinka in the Diaspora, and youth do not recognize their role. Moreover, their influence may be exaggerated. Critics see them as responsible for pushing the country toward tribal politics, especially in the mobilization and recruitment of soldiers from the Dinka community after the 2013 crisis to defend the Kiir government. This led to increased Dinka dominance in the government and security sectors. Thus, some blame the JCE for pushing non-Dinka out of the country. By association, they see President Kiir as having sided with a tribal organization; as one commenter on Miraya FM’s Facebook post wrote,

“If he was wise he would have decided to be the president of the people but not a tribal chief.”

According to a Facebook commenter,



Still others allege that the JCE paid Taban Deng to join the government and support the *Nuer wew*.




Why it is offensive/inflammatory: The term *JCE* itself is not hate speech; however, when the Transitional Government of National Unity is labeled *JCE* or when Dinkas as a whole are labeled *JCE* the speaker seeks to blame a whole government or a whole communal group for the beliefs or actions of an ethnic nationalist group. Used with this intent and meaning, the term polarizes ethnicity and language and may incite people to violence. The *JCE* are seen as Dinka extremists threatening other communities' existence who in turn believe they must react. This reaction threatens Dinka who do not support *JCE* or Dinka extremists. Equating the *JCE* with the TGoNU also has the effect of discouraging non-Dinka people from trusting in the decisions and policies of the government, which reduces their legitimacy and support across the country.

Alternative words that could be used: Dinka nationalists; Dinka chiefs; Dinka elders; community leaders; Dinka elites; Jieng elders

14) Kiiriminal/Kiirminal

Other spellings and related references: *Kiiriminal mayardit; Kiirisis; Kiiristians*

Sample post (*Sudan Tribune*):



Definition: This term combines President Salva Kiir’s name and the English word ‘criminal,’ as well as ‘crisis’ and ‘Christian.’ It does not refer to a tribe, but to those who run the country alongside President Kiir. It is a popular term on social media used by those critical of Kiir and his government to refer both to Kiir’s actions as President of South Sudan and to real or alleged actions of his government, including human rights violations, corruption, and money laundering, as well as inadequate schools, roads, and hospitals and the general lack of development resulting from that corruption. As one workshop participant saw it, “It means that the government of Kiir is more of a criminal system.” The term may be popular in part because many South Sudanese may not know the identities of other officials of Kiir’s government, and thus, he is blamed. However, since he is the center of a centralized government, he attracts this critical focus. In a related way, *Kiirisis* refers to the crisis in governance under his rule.


Why it is offensive/inflammatory: The term is offensive because it characterizes President Kiir as criminal and his actions as those of a criminal or as illegal. It puts the blame for South Sudan’s conflict and problems on one person, personalizing it even if there are other factors. While labeling a policy as criminal might be more constructive, personalizing the criticism with ‘Kiiriminal’ might incite his supporters or his government’s supporters against the speaker.

Alternative words that could be used: President Kiir; Salva Kiir; Kiir government

15) 1991

Other spellings and related references: *Riek Machar 1991 genocide; the Bor massacre; the Bor genocide*

Sample Post:



Definition: The term refers to what’s also commonly known as the 1991 Bor massacre of Dinka civilians by Nuer forces (SPLM-Nasir faction) that opposed Dr. John Garang. The genocidal killing was one of many brutal episodes of atrocities committed by factions in the SPLM’s internal

conflicts during the Second Sudanese Civil War. It has also come to mean a split between allies, revenge, and loyalty to tribal leadership, with the added resonance of the split within the SPLM affecting the larger historic struggle for independence from Khartoum.


Why it's offensive/inflammatory: Dinka leaders have used this reference to massacres of Dinka civilians in Bor to incite the Bor Dinka against the Nuer and to demonize Dr. Machar by reminding them that Machar is power-hungry and has been responsible for massacres in the past. Indeed, one respondent noted that reference to the massacres has been made on national television by President Kiir himself. One intent for its use may be to mobilize Dinka for pre-emptive action. Yet the term also provokes other reactions. While it is normally used to refer to the killing of Dinka, the term angers people of Nuer and other communities who also lost family and friends in the second Sudanese Civil War. Finally, while the post-2013 conflict has been different because it has occurred during self-rule, neither the 1991 nor the 1985 killings have been fully investigated or addressed. Thus, the internal divisions and the damage they cause are perpetuated.

Alternative words that could be used: Nasir Faction; misunderstanding between SPLM separatists; 1991 coup against Dr. Garang; 1991 SPLM power struggle

16) Coward/cowards

Other spellings and related references: *arioch (Dinka); Muwatin (Juba Arabic)*

Sample post:



Definition: Coward is a common English language term conveying weakness or fearfulness; it is used by all sides and with many different meanings depending on the circumstance. It is sometimes associated with being a woman since women are perceived as more vulnerable and less inclined to fight. The term is often used by Dinkas as a response to being labeled ‘foolish majority.’ In the first months after the conflict started in Juba in 2013, Dinka were portrayed on social media as ‘genocidal cowards’ while Nuer were portrayed as ‘heroic freedom fighters.’ It is also frequently used by Dinka and Nuer, the two primary tribes behind the warring sides, against Equatorians to accuse them of not wanting to fight. Some Nuer taunt the Dinka-majority Kiir government and military by saying that they’re *cowards* who were only rescued by the Ugandan military and other outside help or needed help from IO defectors on the battlefield (especially against the IO stronghold in Pagak). The Kiir government has also been called out as cowards for kidnapping activists outside the country like Aggrey Idris and Dong Samuel. It may also be used by the supporters of the government to refer to the hit-and-run tactics exhibited by all rebel groups opposed to the government, particularly along the major roads leading into the capital Juba. Another usage has been between Dinka groups. For example, former Gen. Paul Malong, a

Bahr-el-Ghazal Dinka, reportedly, called Bor Dinka *cowards*. According to a commenter on the online Sudan Tribune above, it can also refer to those targeting civilians.

The fact that protection of civilians' camps are necessary to protect different groups allows those communities to be labeled *cowards* as their people need to be protected by the United Nations. Finally, the term has been used to refer to those men who fled the country as refugees or as military defectors, as well as youth who do not join the fighting.



Why it is offensive/inflammatory: It is highly provocative since it refers to a person's abilities as a fighter and their willingness to defend their community; as such, it can be a recruiting tool as youth do not want to be perceived as cowards. It also labels whole groups as responsible for the actions of individuals, for example, the Dinkas rather than the Kiir government comprised of Dinkas. There is a common notion that Equatorians like to talk rather than act or fight - for this they are then called cowards. It is also used to criticize those who leave their communities (especially Nuer) to join the Kiir government and then kill people from their own community.

Alternative words that could be used: fighters; civilians; rebels; peace-loving; peaceful people; civilized; law-abiding


17) Camjiec

Other spellings and related references: *Camjiec thiele wec; Camjiec Nueri; Camjiec Nuer Wew; Nueri Yoni camjiec; camjiec mi tee dii; food fighters; food lovers; akulu barau*

Sample post:



Definition: Used alone as *camjiec*, the Nuer term connotes an extremely greedy and selfish person; for example, *camjiec Nueri* means an extremely greedy Nuer person. It is often used to criticize those Nuer, such as Taban Deng Gai, who joined the Kiir government to fight against the Nuer-led IO rebels. These individuals are perceived by some people to be 'sell-outs' bought off by the Kiir government or the Jieng Council of Elders. On Facebook, for example, a poster wrote



It aims to convey someone is so selfish as to be heartless; for example, some people refer to a person who is a 'gun for hire' or mercenary as *camjiec*. *Camjiec thiele wec* is used to describe a greedy person whose greed has left him alone without a home. It also has been used to refer to leaders who, upon being appointed or elected by their communities, neglected to give back or provide for their community. *Akulu barau*, for example, refers to corrupt officials who embezzle public funds without delivering the public service.


Why it is offensive/inflammatory: It is one of the worst insults among the Nuer; it is highly offensive to call another Nuer greedy and selfish because one disagrees with their political perspective. Since the Nuer who joined the Kiir government are considered not only traitors to the Nuer community but traitors for money, it is a highly provocative phrase and has led to more conflict, especially at the local level within communities.

Alternative words that could be used: Nuer allies of Kiir; political opponent; dissenter

18) Kuethpiny

Other spellings and related references: *Kuethpiny lual; Kiir Kuethpiny Lual*

Sample post:



Definition: In general, using one part of a South Sudanese man's full name is not unusual; however, it may be taken as bullying if the speaker uses a name that the targeted person doesn't like. Kuethpiny is a Dinka word and is the name of President Kiir's father. When used as part of his proper name Salva Kiir Mayardit Kuethpiny, it is not offensive. Kuethpiny itself also means 'the ground or earth is full;' when used as part of Kiir or another person's name, it refers to children who were passed away before they were born, and is meant to console the parents. However, in the context of the war, it has been used to suggest that Kiir and his government have killed a lot of people. It can also mean 'black beetles' in certain contexts.


Why it is offensive/inflammatory: Referring to one part of someone's full name may be seen as bullying and provocative, but not in all cases. However, the term has different impact in different parts of the country - for example, in Bahr-el-Ghazal or Bor. In Bor, it has been used to mean 'we will keep fighting no matter how full the ground is with our dead bodies.' On social media, it has been used to indicate Kiir is responsible for the death of many South Sudanese.

Alternative words that could be used: President Kiir; Kiir

19) Tabanist/Tabanists

Other spellings and related references: *Taban wew, Tabanist sell-outs, Tabanist militias, Crownist, IO in Crown, STD/STDs, IO Crown Hotel, IO in Government, Kiir's wives*

Sample post:




Get Your History Straight That is the madness of those tabanist they pretended themselves for nothing while they have any single signatory in the peace process they cheated themselves not the world
Like · Reply · 49w

Stephen Deng Leave them yaa mr. Rout .The Tabanists groups beneficiaries.
Like · Reply · 20w

Definition: The term was invented by SPLM-IO members to refer to those IO members who defected and remained in Juba following the July 2016 fighting in the J1. Taban Deng Gai, Machar's second in command, and other IO members broke away to join the government; Kiir then appointed Taban First Vice President in place of Machar. Machar and his IO faction criticized the Taban faction as disloyal and sell-outs, and began to label them as *Nuer wew*, food lovers, soft hearted, and defectors. Those opposition leaders and members who have crossed sides are widely perceived to have been bought off by the Kiir government. Since then, Taban Deng led brutal military campaigns against Machar's IO in several states to weaken or win over those forces and to legitimize the Taban faction in the Transitional Government of National Unity. Machar's supporters allege that Taban stole oil income when he was the governor of Unity State and has used that money to buy off Machar's supporters. *Crownist* or *IO in Crown* refers to the hotel where Taban Deng Gai resided and where he announced that he was joining the Kiir government. *STD* are the initials of Stephen Taban Deng — but also the acronym for sexually-transmitted disease — and *STDs* is a reference to his followers.

Why it is offensive/inflammatory: To those in opposition to the Kiir government, a Tabanist would not only be an opportunist or a sell-out but a traitor. Taban himself is referred to by some online commenters as STD (the acronym for sexually-transmitted disease), as a Judas to the Nuer, and as a blood traitor. STD is commonly equated with HIV/AIDS in South Sudan, so associating Taban Deng with STD maligns him further. SPLM-IO members consider Taban Deng and Kiir the same people; a Tabanist is thus seen as a supporter of someone who waged war and destruction on former comrades and their families. The fighting between IO factions in Pagak killed many people and displaced many civilians. In general, this split has bitterly divided the

Nuer, which has led to fighting between supporters of the two sides in POC camps in Juba this year.⁴² One IO supporter commenting on Facebook expressed the acute sense of betrayal saying,





Alternative words that could be used: (Vice President) Taban Deng Gai; opportunist; supporter of Kiir government

20) Konyo Konyo Regime

Other spellings and related references: *Suuk konyo konyo/Suk Konyokonyo; Ashuwai; Juakali government*

Sample post:



Definition: *Konyo konyo* is the biggest open-air market in the capital, Juba, featuring people from the neighboring countries of South Sudan. It is very busy and dirty. The term appears to have emerged during the 2018 negotiations for a peace agreement. Its usage connotes that the central government is rife with local feuds, disorganized, lacking planning and coordination, and incompetent. More negatively, it may be seen as a black market with illegal activities.

Why it is offensive/inflammatory: While this is not a common term, referring to the Kiir government as a dirty, disorganized local market place would be seen as insulting and offensive. It conveys lack of planning, rules, and enforcement, but as such is more critical and derogatory than inflammatory. It depicts the government as disorganized and out of control, and conveys that the regime is illegitimate and criminal like a black market.

Alternative words that could be used: Kiir government; Kiir leadership; South Sudan government; government of the people of South Sudan

Additional Words or Phrases That Are Offensive and Inflammatory

Workshops were held in Nairobi, Kenya in October 2018 in order to validate the primary terms. At these workshops, participants identified additional terms that were new or that were not included in the preceding list of terms. Given the limited scope of the workshops, there is less contextual information for these new terms. In addition, a few terms were contributed by the expert advisors.

Nas Kujuur:	a phrase that characterizes people from Equatoria as practitioners of witchcraft and magic. Since the phrase denigrates them as irrational and superstitious, it is offensive.
Mathiang Anyor/nyor nyor:	a phrase generalizing all Dinka people as Mathiang Anyor, a Dinka military force set up in 2012 by Gen. Malong that was separate from the military and could be controlled by President Kiir. ⁴²
Wewe:	a term used to denigrate South Sudanese people returning to the Equatoria regions usually from East African countries (wewe is a swahili word meaning ‘you’). It’s also used towards other Africans, especially people from East Africa, who come to work in South Sudan. In the 2016 fighting, the Jebel market was looted by government soldiers and most of those affected were foreign nationals from Uganda and Kenya who are referred to negatively as Wewe.
Railway lines:	a phrase used by people from Equatoria to refer to a Dinka person who has traditional marks on their forehead. The word is used to characterize Dinka as arrogant and brainless people who are quick to violence.
Contour lines:	a phrase used by people from Equatoria against Nuer. Contour lines is intended to refer to people whose brains are not stable, who are not principled, and who cannot be trusted as they can change direction. The word is hate speech, although as yet no violence related to it has been reported.
Nanda:	is a word in Juba Arabic used by people of Juba town to refer to Mundari people in Equatoria as backward, naked, and dirty people.
Dinkocracy:	a term that refers to the government of South Sudan as being run only by Dinkas and being led by Dinkas in a crazy, chaotic way.
Terrorists:	an extreme characterization of the rebel opposition who have not signed the R-ACRSS. It was recently used by Vice President Wani Igga to refer to Thomas Cirilo’s forces and other groups who chose not to sign on to the agreement after its 8-month pre-transitional period. ⁴³ Terrorists are widely believed to kill indiscriminately and without a moral basis; governments use the term to remove any moral concerns in dealing with them. When a high-level official like Wani Igga uses the term, it provides legitimacy for extreme responses against the perceived terrorists.
NCPLMers:	the term refers to former NCP (National Congress Party of Sudan) members who are now in the SPLM.
Khartoumers:	refers to South Sudanese who have returned from Sudan and who are accused of having taken many of the good jobs in South Sudan.

Annex: Methodology and Considerations

Methodology

Social Media Monitoring

For this new South Sudan lexicon, the project team employed a slightly different methodology. For the initial collection of terms and their contextual information, the project team drew on data obtained by small groups of human monitors in both 2017 and 2018. Each team was comprised of 3-4 individuals representing South Sudan's different communities. In 2017, the team did the monitoring in real time. As that monitoring was discontinued at the end of 2017, the project established a new monitoring team in 2018 to search for terms from the end of 2017 through August 2018. The data collection was not set to follow certain terms over time; however, certain terms recurred in multiple monitoring periods, and indeed, some continued to be a problem from the time period covered by the original lexicon into the time period for this second lexicon. This new lexicon aims to show the most important terms and their context, rather than track the evolution of particular terms over time. Nonetheless, certain changes in contextual information or usage may be reflected in the definition section. The terms from the two monitoring episodes were collected, analyzed, and written up into a draft lexicon in the fall of 2018.

Validation Workshops

As with the first South Sudan lexicon, the draft was then presented to groups of South Sudanese who were invited to workshops held in Nairobi, Kenya to assess whether the terms in the draft were indeed ones observed online, and whether and how they were potent and problematic — 'offensive and inflammatory' according to our guidance. The workshop participants were also asked to provide historical and contextual information, as well as to share other terms they had encountered which met the threshold. Participants were chosen in order to have a cross-section of South Sudanese society represented.

Expert Advisors

Again, as with the previous lexicon, the inputs from the workshop participants were then incorporated into a new draft of the lexicon. This draft was then presented to a small group of expert advisors for their review and critique. The advisors were selected based on their expertise and also represented a cross-section of South Sudan's communities. Their comments and edits were analyzed and incorporated into a new draft; the project team also added data visualizations into this new draft. Once updated, this near-final draft was reviewed anew by the expert advisors; their views were then incorporated and the publication was finalized.

Ranking of the Terms

The data under analysis (the terms and their contextual information) is mixed; it was collected both in real-time and after-the-fact by both automated and human monitors whose composition changed over time. Since one method didn't prevail throughout, the project team attempted to identify the new terms both by frequency of instance in the monitoring as well as by repeated appearance over the multiple monitoring phases. Once the new terms were assembled from the monitoring as well as from the workshops, the project team asked the expert advisors to rank the terms in the lexicon according to their level of 'offensive and inflammatory' as well as to their level of prevalence online.

Alternative Terms

In the first South Sudan lexicon, online survey respondents were specifically asked to provide alternative terms that could be used instead of the offensive and inflammatory speech, while

the authors and workshop participants also contributed a few other terms. For this second lexicon, the human monitors identified alternative terms while the project team contributed as well; in addition, the workshop participants and expert advisors suggested some alternative terms.

Issues and Risks

During the research process, the project team encountered several issues and risks that it attempted to mitigate.

Limitations regarding source data

The previous lexicon on South Sudan utilized an online survey to gather an initial set of hate speech terms and their context, while this lexicon relied on searches by a team of monitors. Thus, this lexicon drew on far fewer observers which could have led to cognitive biases in the interpretation of the terms' meaning and context (this was likely less an impact in the original given the multiplicity of respondents), and quality of contextual information captured (survey respondents had time to reflect on their inputs, whereas monitors had to capture what detail was available in a limited period of time). Nonetheless, the project addressed these risks by utilizing validation workshops and expert reviewers to evaluate and validate the data. Moreover, in order to ensure a strong validation effort, the project team drew on participants from the workshops conducted for the original lexicon in order to have a sophisticated cadre of validators.

Limitations of Time and Scope

In order to develop a lexicon that would be useful for related program activities, the timeframe for the development of this lexicon was compressed. Specifically, this meant that the survey approach used for PeaceTech Lab's prior South Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon lexicons was replaced by human and automated monitoring. In the former process, 50-150 respondents contributed nuanced input to a structured survey; in the current process, teams of human monitors searched for terms over the two years 2017-2018. The results of the human monitor searches were then aggregated and analyzed by the lexicon's lead author. In the prior process, the survey collected terms in real-time, whereas in the current instance most of the data was collected after the fact. In addition, the validation workshops which took place over three days for the first South Sudan lexicon, were in this instance covered in two days; they also featured a South Sudanese facilitator in addition to project staff. Both past and current methodologies involved two rounds of critical reviews by a representative group of expert advisors. In sum, while the development of the lexicon proceeded somewhat differently from prior methodologies, the project addressed potential limitations or vulnerabilities in the initial data collection by incorporating the critical inputs from the validation workshops and expert advisors.

Limitations Regarding Project Methodology and Hate Speech Concepts

While hate speech is not a new feature in the South Sudan conflict, nor elsewhere, methodologies for identifying and analyzing hate speech are relatively new and in need of not only testing and refining, but also of elucidating and explaining. PeaceTech Lab's approach seeks to identify the words and phrases being used and their context in order to understand the dynamics that make them inflammatory. However, since there isn't a universally accepted or understood definition of hate speech, the team uses the phrase 'offensive and inflammatory' as a threshold to guide monitors, peer reviewers, and expert advisors in assessing such speech. The terms are then considered in terms as to the level of offensive and inflammatory on a continuum of derogatory, offensive, and action. In this way, the team aims to avoid the tendency to seek legal definitions, but rather allow for the fluid nature of language in situations of conflict.

Endnotes

In addition to the sources cited below, this lexicon drew on Daniel Akech Thiong, “How the Politics of Fear Generated Chaos in South Sudan,” *African Affairs* 117, no. 469 (October 1, 2018), doi:10.1093/afraf/ady031.

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PeaceTech Lab works for individuals and communities affected by conflict, using technology, media, and data to accelerate local peacebuilding efforts. The Lab's programs emphasize a data-driven, cross-sector approach, engaging everyone from student engineers and citizen journalists to Fortune 500 companies in scaling the impact of peacetechnology.

PeaceTech Lab was established as a Center of Innovation by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 2008, and became an independent nonprofit with expert staff and board of directors in 2014.



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